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This Blog is dedicated to making public some of the business activities and methods of Liam Collins, David Bone Jr and their associates. In the spring of 2010, the present authors invested in Collins & Bone (C&B), who were offering an enticing 8-10% interest on the basis of buying houses for cash, renovating them and letting them out to students. We were assured that our money was secured against houses that they owned, including their own homes and the properties held by their associated company, Castle & Gatehouse (C&G). We have emails and brochures that confirm these details, as do others who invested on this same basis at around the same time. The idea worked for us for over a year, then in November 2011 they told us they were insolvent. They refused our every request for clear accounts, which led us to suspect wrongdoing. We began an investigation and then started this Blog. We found our suspicions confirmed: other investors had lost sometimes quite large amounts to C&B and its predecessor CBS, and all requests for repayment were adamantly refused. These people use and have used so many names that we found it necessary to compress them into CoBo (for Collins & Bone) and Coboco (for the whole bunch of them – there are quite a few!) Note that there is an index in the margin at the right hand side.

Sunday, 8 January 2012


In his letter to investors of 7th January 2012, Liam Collins writes that we were instrumental in preventing a large investment being made in C&G.

At the end of December, 2011, we were contacted by a major-league property investor who was considering putting a very large sum into Castle & Gatehouse and had travelled to Newcastle to visit the C&G team. Before talking to us, be it noted, he already had some reservations about proceeding: for one thing, he was surprised Liam Collins and David Bone Jr were not present as part of the team and also that the company had no proper offices. He was concerned to check that what we were writing on the Blog was accurate. He researched it thoroughly himself and found that it was, and was therefore disinclined to invest in C&G.

This man knows how to calculate and assess probable profits; he established that any deal involving a rolling investment of up to £20m in C&G, where the investor has ownership of the properties, would not be able to generate sufficient surplus to repay investors in previous failed ventures, where the debts amounted to £2m.

Here we note that this sum of £20m has never been given to or secured by Castle & Gatehouse, despite being frequently mentioned in their literature and on their website, no doubt by way of impressing potential investors. (See documentation below, second paragraph).

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